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LOYALTY'S REWARD - A FELONY
CONVICTION: RECENT PROSECUTIONS
OF HIGH-STATUS
FEMALE OFFENDERS
Michelle S. Jacobs*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past four years, the American public has witnessed a
seemingly unending number of corporate and white-collar scan-
dals. Corporate scandals in the business world are not a new phe-
nomenon; indeed, every decade has had its share. Michael Milken,
the Wall Street wonder of the eighties, along with his associate,
Ivan Boesky, were both dethroned in the "junk bond" scandal.'
This was followed by the Savings and Loan scandal that sent
Charles Keating to jail.2 The Archer Daniels Midland price-fixing
scandal3 marked the nineties, as did the Whitewater investigation
that was closely associated with then President William Clinton and
his wife, Hillary Clinton.4
* Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law.
1. See Kathleen Morris, The Reincarnation of Mike Milken, Bus. WEEK, May 10,
1999, available at http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_19/b3628001.htm; see also Bi-
ographical Entry for Ivan Boesky, http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/IvanBo-
esky (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
2. The Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s "turned out to be the costliest white-
collar crime scandal in U.S. history." Kitty Calavita & Henry N. Pontell, The State
and White Collar Crime: Saving the Savings and Loans, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 297,
297 (1994). Charles Keating, the owner of Lincoln Savings and Loan in Irvine, Cali-
fornia, was one of the most notorious figures in this scandal. Savings and Loan Crisis,
http://www.biography.ms/Savings-and_- Loan scandal.html. He was convicted of
fraud and racketeering, and served four-and-a-half years in prison before his convic-
tions were overturned. Id. At the end of the investigations, over eight hundred sav-
ings and loan offenders had been convicted, and seventy-seven percent of them
received prison sentences. Calavita & Pontell, supra, at 297-98.
3. See Nicholas M. Horrock, Analysis: Bush's Corporate Ethics, INSIGHT ON
NEWS, Mar. 18, 2002, http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm/include/detail/storyid/2183
92.html.
4. The investigation was named after a property purchased by Bill Clinton and
Jim McDougal in Marion County, Arkansas. ROBERT W. RAY, INDEPENDENT COUN-
SEL, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION VOL. II.A 1 (2001), available at http://icreport.access.
gpo.gov/final. Some of the Whitewater transactions became part of the Independent
Counsel's investigation of the failure of the Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan As-
sociation. See id.
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Nonetheless, the present wave of corporate and white-collar
scandals distinguishes itself through the sheer number of compa-
nies being investigated.- It appears that no industry has been safe
from scandal.6 The investigations prompted by the collapse of
Houston's energy giant, Enron, were independertly responsible for
the indictments of thirty individuals as of May 2004.7 The present
scandals are also interesting because they provide us with an op-
portunity to observe the prosecutions of several women of high sta-
tus charged with white-collar crime. 8 Other than Susan McDougal,
a defendant in the Whitewater case, 9 and Leona Helmsley, the
5. See James Toedtman, Scandal Scorecard, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 2004, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.comlbusiness/ny-scandal-scorecard,1,7241399.story (listing
nineteen corporate scandals, eleven Wall Street investigations, three investigations of
regulating bodies, and eight mutual funds that were accused of wrongdoing).
6. The Attorney General of New York also investigated the insurance industry.
Since 2004, the hint of scandal continues. See Gretchen Morgenson & Jenny Ander-
son, Insiders Collected $1 Billion Before Refco Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at
C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/20/business/20/refco.html (describing
the collapse of a decades-old investment firm whose insiders received more than one
billion dollars in cash one year before it sold shares to the public and then made the
fourth largest bankruptcy filing in United States history); see also Bayou Hedge Fund
Founder, CFO Plead Guilty: Company Leaders Took Part in Scandal That Allegedly
Cost Investors Millions, MSNBC, Sept. 29, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.
comlid/9530534/from/RL.3/.
7. Enron's bankruptcy now tops the list as the biggest corporate collapse in the
United States. See A Guide to Corporate Scandals, ECONOMIST, July 15, 2002.
8. The definition of the term white-collar crime differs widely among scholars.
As originally coined by Edwin Sutherland, it referred to "a crime committed by a
person of respectability and high status in the course of his occupation." Elizabeth
Szockyj, Imprisoning White Collar Criminals, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 485-86 (1999).
Other scholars remove the focus from the offender and refer instead to a certain
group of offenses. See Stuart Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law,
18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 501, 501 n.3 (2004). The use of deception
by professionals or persons with special technical and professional knowledge to
achieve financial gain is the focus of these offenses. See J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial
Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1207-08 (1999). Strader posits
that it is often better to define white-collar crime by stating what it is not-white-
collar crime does not relate to the possession, sale or distribution of controlled sub-
stances, and excludes all of the following: the use or threat of use of physical force;
activities by organized crime groups; immigration; civil rights; and national security
violations. Id. at 1209-10.
9. Susan McDougal, her husband, James B. McDougal, and then governor of Ar-
kansas, Jim Guy Tucker, were indicted and convicted of conspiracy and fraud in con-
nection with the Whitewater investigation. See The Trials and Tribulations of Susan
McDougal, CNN.coM, Apr. 8, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/
1999/04/08/mcdougal.trials/. James McDougal became a government witness in the
investigation and tried to convince his wife to cooperate as well. Id. She refused, and
in addition to being sentenced to two years on the Whitewater charges, she was held
for eighteen months on a civil contempt charge for refusing to testify in Kenneth
Starr's investigation. Id. McDougal served a total of twenty-two months in jail. Id.
Upon release, she was tried and acquitted of the charge of embezzling funds from
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New York Hotel proprietor,10 one is hard pressed to recall signifi-
cant numbers of women publicly associated in the past with white-
collar crime or corporate scandal at the level we presently see.
Between 2001 and 2004, six high-status women were charged
with crimes in connection with corporate criminal cases. 1 The
public is familiar with some of them, although not all of their cases
have been covered equally in the press. The most thorough press
coverage was of the arrest and trial of Martha Stewart, former
CEO of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, whose case has been
referred to as "mediagenic. "12 Stewart's public persona drove the
coverage, despite the fact her criminal acts were neither the most
serious, nor the most extensive, of the six.' 3 The other five women
conductor Zubin Mehta. Id. She was also indicted for criminal contempt of court and
obstruction of justice as a result of her refusal to testify before Starr's grand jury. Id.
Susan McDougal believed that Ken Starr was "out to get" President Clinton and if
she did not testify the way Starr wanted her to, she would the face a perjury indict-
ment. See McDougal Not Guilty on One Count; Mistrial Declared on Other Two
Charges, CNN.coM, Apr. 12, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/
04/12/mcdougal.verdict/. McDougal testified on her own behalf at her criminal con-
tempt trial and stated that she did not discuss the illegal loan she obtained with the
Clintons. She said that as far as she knew, Clinton had not testified untruthfully to
the grand jury investigating Whitewater. Id. Commentators believed McDougal was
prosecuted because she was viewed as being loyal to Bill Clinton. See Jury Finds
McDougal Not Guilty of All Charges, CNN.coM, Nov. 23, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/
ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/11/23/mcdougal/.
10. See United States v. Helmsley, 985 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1993). In 1991, Leona
and Harry Helmsley, luxury hotel proprietors, were charged with tax evasion. Iver
Peterson, Harry Helmsley: Unfit for Trial But Fit for Business, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
1991, at B1. Harry Helmsley subsequently became too ill to prosecute and Leona bore
the brunt of the criminal prosecution and the media spectacle that accompanied it.
Id. Cf. Joan Macleod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About Equal
Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247 (2003) (con-
trasting Martha Stewart's prosecution with Leona Helmsley's and raising the possibil-
ity that Stewart was prosecuted because she was a successful business woman).
11. See Toedtman, supra note 5.
12. See Allan Sloan, She's a Criminal? Give Me a Break, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15,
2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4467515/; see also Kathleen Brickey,
Mostly Martha, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 517, 521 (2005).
13. See United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 624-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Martha Stewart's case generated ongoing comments in the general press, as well as in
academic circles. Her prosecution was both hailed and denounced. For a sampling of
the law review articles written about Martha Stewart, see Brickey, supra note 12;
Heminway, supra note 10; Ellen S. Podgor, Jose Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who
Should Be Charged With Criminal Conduct?, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1059 (2005);
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 2023 (2005); Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecut-
ing Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and The Need For a Law of Counts, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 1107 (2005). See also Kathleen Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 BuFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 221 (2004).
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are Lea Fastow, former assistant treasurer of Enron;14 Betty Vin-
son, former account manager for WorldCom; 15 Kathleen Winter,
former director at Marsh & McLennan, Inc.;16 Helen Sharkey, of
Dynegy, Inc.;17 and Paula Rieker, former Vice President, Managing
Director of Investor Relations and Corporate Secretary of En-
ron.18 Lea Fastow's prosecution received some media attention, al-
though the simultaneous prosecution of her husband, Andrew
Fastow, the former CFO of Enron, undoubtedly motivated the cov-
erage. 9 Similarly, Betty Vinson's case came to the attention of the
press because her guilty plea helped secure the government's case
against the CFO of World Com, Scott Sullivan. Sullivan eventually
entered into a cooperation agreement with the government.2 0 His
cooperation enabled the government to prosecute Bernard Ebbers,
the CEO of WorldCom at the time the telecommunications firm
collapsed.2 1 Relatively little information can be found in the public
domain about the other three women, who have all plead guilty,
and are presently cooperating with authorities and awaiting sen-
tencing in 2006.
During the same period of time these corporate scandals were
unfolding, another "mediagenic" case of a high-status woman was
investigated and prosecuted. This woman was rap artist Lil' Kim,
whose birth name is Kimberly Jones.22 At first blush, Lil' Kim's
14. See United States v. Fastow, 300 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
15. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 234 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
16. Another Marsh Exec Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging in Spitzer Probe, INS. J., Feb.
24, 2005, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2005/02/24/51926.htm.
17. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation Release No. 18188 (June
12, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18188.htm.
18. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Enron Executive Paula
Rieker Pleads Guilty to Insider Trading, Agrees to Cooperate with Ongoing Probe
(May 19, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_crm_347.htm.
Rieker plead to a one-count information alleging that she engaged in insider trading
in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78ff and § 78j (b). Id.
19. See Mary Flood, Enron Judge Rejects Plea Bargain for Lea Fastow, HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 7, 2004, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/
2340879.html; Krysten Crawford, Lea Fastow Pleads - Who's Next?, CNN.coM, May
6, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/2004/05/06/news/midcaps/enron_lfastow/. Over one-
half of the content in the articles mentioning Lea Fastow focus on the male defend-
ants in the case.
20. Brooke A. Masters, Two Who Falsified Books At WorldCom Testify, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2005, at E02.
21. Ebbers was convicted at trial and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. See
Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Long To Jail White-Collar Criminals?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2005, at C1.
22. See Lil' Kim Faces November Trial, MSNBC, Apr. 19, 2004, available at http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4739992.
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case appeared to fit within the parameters of the prosecutions of
the other high-status women. She was, for example, charged with a
classic white-collar cover-up crime, as was Martha Stewart.23 She
was charged in connection with an investigation into the actions of
others. However, for reasons that will be discussed in Part IV of
this Article, Lil' Kim's high status was not sufficient to elevate her
case to the level of white-collar treatment.24
The fact that little media attention has been devoted to these
women's cases is not surprising. With the exception of an occa-
sional article now and then mentioning the exploding rates of fe-
male incarceration, women's crime tends to be invisible to the
public eye.25 The statistical data the government collects and ana-
lyzes on women and crime will be discussed in Part II. Through the
use of this data, a portrait of the female offender will be developed,
and the factors, or pathways, which lead to women's offending will
be discussed. In addition, a query will be made as to whether a
pathway based on loyalty can be added. What can the experiences
of Fastow, Vinson, and Stewart tell us about women's crime? Is
there a basis of comparison between the prosecution of these high-
status women and the prosecution of women engaged in regular
street crime?
Part III of this Article will focus on the prosecution of the indi-
vidual cases of Fastow, Vinson, and Stewart. Their cases, and
where relevant, their life circumstances, and the issue of whether
loyalty played a role in their offending, will be examined and con-
trasted with the experiences of female offenders who are not of
high status. Lil' Kim's prosecution will be the focus of Part IV and
will highlight the problems of a female offender of color who has
high status but whose acts are deemed to be street crimes. The
Article concludes by suggesting that although the high-status fe-
male white-collar offender does not share the personal characteris-
tics of the regular female offender, the two groups of women share
a common pathway to crime-loyalty to a man engaged in wrong-
doing. Moreover, white-collar female offenders do not differ sig-
23. The term "cover up" crime is used by Professor Stuart P. Green to describe
crimes that are ultimately used to establish criminal liability when the prosecutor can-
not establish liability for the crime that serves as the basis of the initial investigation.
Cover-up crimes include perjury, making a false statement, and obstruction of justice.
See Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 9
(2005).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See Fox Butterfield, Women Find a New Arena for Equality: Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at A9.
20061
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nificantly from many women who are incarcerated for street
crimes. Lil' Kim's case offers an example of how strikingly close a
street crime offender can be to a white-collar offender.
II. WOMEN AND CRIME
In the past, women's crime was not specifically studied to deter-
mine whether the criminal justice policies that were developed with
men in mind were put to appropriate use with women offenders.
There was an unspoken assumption that the analysis of men's crim-
inality would satisfactorily explain women's criminality. By all
measures available now, that assumption was erroneous. 26 Most
women in prison have been convicted of non-violent crimes, prop-
erty crimes, and low-level drug offenses. 27 The majority of incar-
cerated women are women of color.28 Incarcerated women, in
general, had attained low levels of education and were living under
harsh economic conditions prior to their arrest.29 Over forty per-
cent of women offenders reported a history of physical or sexual
abuse prior to offending. 30
The factors that appear to contribute to women's criminality are
low income, school failure, and limited vocational skills and work
experience.3' In addition, women victims of profound physical and
sexual abuse tend toward a disproportionately criminal path.32 The
two scholars most frequently cited who study women's pathways to
crime are sociologists Kathleen Daly and Beth Richie. In her
study, Daly compared women and men's offending within the con-
26. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & TRACY SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WO-
MEN OFFENDERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 9-10 (1999),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wo.pdf.
27. See Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: The Plight of Non-
violent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 133, 137
(1999). In federal prisons, seventy-two percent of incarcerated women were con-
victed of drug offenses; an additional twelve percent were incarcerated for property
crimes, which included larceny and fraud. See GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 26, at
6. The authors state that twenty-six percent of women admitted to prison following a
court sentence are convicted of larceny or fraud, compared with ten percent of men.
Id.; see also Nancy Gertner, Women Offenders and the Sentencing Guidelines, 14
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 291, 293 (2002) (arguing that women's crimes are less serious
than the crimes men commit and that women's crimes cluster around drugs, embez-
zlement and fraud).
28. LENORA LAPIDUS ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET: THE IMPACT OF DRUG POLI-
CIES ON WOMEN AND FAMILIES, 17-18 (2005), available at http://www.fairlaws4fami-
lies.org.
29. GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 26, at 5.
30. Id.
31. See KATHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT 43-45 (1994).
32. Id.
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text of a criminal court in Connecticut.33 Richie, on the other
hand, focused on battered African American women detained at
Riker's Island in New York. 34 Though each used differing nomen-
clature for the pathways they observed, both recognized the role
violence, abuse, and poverty played in the pathways.3 5 Daly's cate-
gory of "other" included women who were not abused or drug-
addicted and seemed to commit crime out of economic necessity or
greed.3 6 Although both sociologists make reference to crimes com-
mitted by women in association with men, Richie specifically men-
tions loyalty as a factor that may trap African American battered
women.
37
None of the factors traditionally found among women offenders
appear to be relevant for the six White high-status women featured
in this article. Which, if any, factors would be predictive of white-
collar offenses among women? After the feminist movement took
root in the United States, theories abounded suggesting that with
women's impending liberation, there would be a corresponding in-
crease in the number of women committing white-collar crime.3 8
The theory was that as more women moved up the corporate lad-
der, there would be more opportunity to engage in the same types
of crimes as male executives.39 This expected increase in women's
white-collar crime did not materialize. Although the number of
women in prison has increased, this is believed to be a result of
changes in criminal justice policy, rather than changes in the
33. Id. at 3-5.
34. See BETH E. RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME 101 (1996).
35. Daly identified five types of women criminals: street women, harmed and
harming women, battered women, drug-connected women, and "others." DALY,
supra note 31, at 45-49. Richie, on the other hand, identified six pathways from the
women's stories of what led them to the point of arrest: women held hostage, projec-
tion and association, sexual exploitation, fighting back, poverty, and drug addiction.
RICHIE, supra note 34, at 105-23.
36. DALY, supra note 31, at 48. There may be some overlap between Daly's
"other" and Richie's "poverty" path. However, Richie's poverty path is defined as
poverty caused by refusal of a violent spouse or intimate other to support a woman.
RICHIE, supra note 34, at 120.
37. RICHIE, supra note 34, at 51.
38. See FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW FEMALE CRIMI-
NAL 164, 167-69 (1975).
39. Id. The theory has since been soundly criticized. See, e.g., MEDA CHESNEY-
LIND & LISA PASKO, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN, AND CRIME (2d ed.
2004). Chesney-Lind points to some studies by law enforcement that attempted to
link women's crime to the movement for female equality. She argues, however, that
careful analysis of the data relied upon disputed the "liberation" or "emancipation"
hypothesis. Id. at 112-14.
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amount and type of crime women commit. 40 More women are now
being sent to prison for offenses that used to garner only a proba-
tionary sentence, but women still primarily commit non-violent
crimes: larceny, theft, drunken driving, and fraud.41 In criminal en-
terprises, women still function at the lower echelons, clustered at
the bottom of the organizational hierarchy, and their involvement
in criminal activity is as minor players rather than primary
players.42
The typical life circumstances and characteristics of women in-
carcerated today appear strikingly different from the women
named in corporate scandals. The six women previously identified
in this Article are White, highly educated, and worked in high-sta-
tus positions, enjoying relatively large salaries. It is doubtful
whether they serve as an indication that women have arrived in the
higher ranks of white-collar crime. Indeed, it might be argued that
although these women do not fit the characteristics of most female
offenders, their crimes nonetheless fit squarely within the second
most prevalent category of women's crime: fraud. In addition, de-
spite the fact that there has been an increase in the number of wo-
men charged with embezzlement, most women charged in this
category of offense are still low-level clerical staff and bank tell-
ers.4 3 The women mentioned in this Article are not low-level cleri-
cal staff. Nonetheless, despite their job titles, with the exception of
Martha Stewart, they were removed from the centers of decision
making.
A. Loyalty-A New Path to Crime?
Women's loyalty to principal male offenders, and its relationship
to female offending, is an issue of concern. 4 The connection be-
tween a woman's criminality and a man's is most clearly demon-
strated in the cases of women who are prosecuted for drug
offenses. 45 Eda Katharine Tinto argues that the comfort and com-
40. Gertner, supra note 27, at 303.
41. CHESNEY-LIND & PASKO, supra note 39, at 99.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 103. The data cited indicates that gains of men engaged in fraud were
ten times higher than the gains achieved by women. Id. Fastow and Vinson appear to
fit this pattern as well.
44. Gertner, supra note 27, at 305; Tracy Huling, Women Drug Couriers, 9 CRIM.
JusT. 14, 16 (1995) (detailing narratives of women imprisoned for acting as mules on
behalf of men they loved or feared).
45. See generally Celesta A. Albonetti, The Joint Conditioning Effect of Defen-
dant's Gender and Ethnicity on Length of Imprisonment Under the Federal Guidelines
for Drug Trafficking/Manufacturing Offenders, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 39 (2002);
[Vol. XXXIII
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panionship of an intimate relationship may outweigh the risks of
providing help to a partner engaged in crime.46 The woman may
also be dependent on the male offender for financial support for
herself and her children.47
At least four prosecution methods are used to establish a wo-
man's criminal liability through the actions of a connected male:
constructive possession charges, 48 conspiracy charges, 49 accomplice
liability,50 and asset forfeiture laws.5' Most women engaged in
crimes related to drug offenses are engaged at a low level in the
enterprise and do not have major responsibility within the organi-
zations. They may also have very little knowledge of the details of
the enterprise itself. Once arrested for a drug offense, they are
unable, at the time of sentencing, to obtain significant departures
from sentencing guidelines through "substantial assistance" agree-
see also Eda Katharine Tinto, Note, The Role of Gender and Relationship in Re-
forming the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 917 (2001) (finding that
women's drug crime is often in support of partner's larger drug activities).
46. Tinto, supra note 45, at 918. However, she also notes that the woman might
also calculate the risk she may encounter leaving the intimate partner if abuse is pre-
sent in the relationship. Id. at 919. The woman may find it safer to assist in the
criminal undertaking rather than risk injury to herself. Id.
47. Id.
48. See LAPIDUS ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET, supra note 28, at 36-37. Leah
Bundy was charged and convicted for weapons found in her boyfriend's apartment.
Id. Bundy had gone upstairs to use the bathroom when the police raided the wrong
apartment. Id. Constructive possession is a doctrine used to explain possession
crimes where physical control of the item in question cannot be proved. WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 213 (2000). Instead, the court will look to whether the de-
fendant had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the item. Id.
49. LAPIDUS ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET, supra note 28, at 35. This book in-
cludes the narrative of Sally Smith, who was charged with conspiracy for making two
phone calls to collect money owed to her boyfriend and signing two receipts for a cash
exchange. Id. She was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Id. A con-
spiracy is an agreement between two or more persons formed for the purpose of do-
ing either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means. LAFAVE, supra note 48,
at 569.
50. LAPIDUS ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET, supra note 28, at 36. Brenda Prather
handed her boyfriend a role of aluminum foil which he used in drug related activity.
Id. The state imputed knowledge of the drug activity to her and she was convicted.
Id. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when he is an accom-
plice of the other person's commission of the crime. LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 620.
51. LAPIDUS ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET, supra note 28, at 35-38. Eda Katharine
Tinto formulates the categories somewhat differently, focusing on constructive pos-
session, actions (non-criminal) that support criminal activity, and low-level criminal
acts. Tinto, supra note 45 at 922-25. Among the activities which are described as
supportive are opening the door to an apartment or using money that is the product
of prior drug activity. Id.; see also Haneefah A. Jackson, When Love is a Crime: Why
the Drug Prosecutions and Punishment of Female Non-conspirators Cannot be Justi-
fied by Retributive Principles, 46 How. L.J. 517, 518-19 (2003).
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ments. They have little information of value to offer law enforce-
ment officials. Frequently, these low-level women end up with
more significant sentences than the principal male offenders, as the
principals can negotiate cooperation agreements.52 And even
when the women may be able to assist the government, many re-
fuse to do so because they do not want to be disloyal to the men
who support them.5 3
While the three women discussed in this article are not involved
in the drug trade, there does appear to be a close connection for
two of them between their offending and their relationships, even
if they are only business relationships, with men who are principal
offenders. In Martha Stewart's case, it is not altogether clear
whether loyalty played a role in her offending.
III. WOMEN AND ACTUAL OFFENSES
As is apparent from the discussion above, Fastow, Vinson, and
Stewart do not reflect, at least to the naked eye, the normal path-
ways to crime that can be identified for most women. Indeed, they
seem to meet the definition of Professor Daly's "other" category:
women who commit crimes for financial reasons, unaffected by
drug addiction, substance abuse, physical or mental abuse, or
mental health issues.54 All three, however, fall squarely within the
category of fraud, which is the most common category of women's
crime, second only to drugs. In addition, at least two shared a fac-
tor that is commonly found among women incarcerated for street
crimes, particularly drug offenses. That trait is loyalty to a man,
who is the primary wrongdoer. Of the three, Betty Vinson and Lea
Fastow were the most seriously impacted by loyalty to the men in
their lives. In this sense they are not terribly different from the
wives, girlfriends, and friends of street criminals.
52. See Myrna Raeder, The Forgotten Offender: The Effect of the Sentencing
Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums on Women and their Crimes, 8 FED. SENT'C
REP. 157 (2002); see also Statement of Position, National Association of Women
Judges, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 176 (1995).
53. See generally PAULA C. JOHNSON, INNER LIVES: VOICES OF AFRICAN AMERI-
CAN WOMEN IN PRISON 212-14 (2000) (Angela Thompson, who was prosecuted for
aiding her uncle's drug operation and refused to take a plea, believing it would re-
quire her to testify against her uncle, was sentenced as a first-time offender to fifteen
years to life.).
54. See DALY, supra note 31, at 48.
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A. United States v. Betty Vinson
1. The Facts
Prior to its collapse, WorldCom was a telecommunications giant.
Through mergers, it had grown from a small long distance company
into the entity that became known as WorldCom.55 Betty Vinson
started her employment with the company as a mid-level account-
ant when it was still a small company. 6 Ms. Vinson was described
as a "loyal employee who would do anything you told her."'5 7 Af-
ter a promotion, elevating her to senior manager in WorldCom's
Corporate Accounting division, Vinson's responsibilities included
compiling data for the company's quarterly statements.5 8 Unfortu-
nately for Vinson, she and co-worker, Troy Normand, were ap-
proached in 2000 by their superior, Buford Yates, who asked them
to engage in questionable accounting practices in order to help
close a gap between WorldCom's performance and Wall Street's
expectations.59 Initially, Vinson and Norman were concerned and
disturbed by the request and did not want to oblige.6° Later, at the
trial of Bernard Ebbers, the CEO of WorldCom, Vinson testified
that she initially decided to quit rather than comply with the re-
quest.61 She drafted a letter of resignation but never submitted it.62
Scott Sullivan, the CFO of WorldCom, took personal responsibility
for allaying the fears of Vinson and Normand.63 He appealed to
her sense of loyalty and assured her that the manipulation was just
for one quarter, that nothing she was doing was illegal, and that he
would take responsibility if anything happened. 6' She testified that
Sullivan convinced her that the fraudulent entries were just for the
quarter, a one-time incident, and that he just needed time to turn
55. See Susan Pulliam, Over the Line: A Staffer Ordered to Commit Fraud Balked,
Then Caved-Pushed by WorldCom Bosses, Accountant Betty Vinson Helped Cook
the Books-A Confession at the Marriot, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2003, at Al [hereinaf-
ter Pulliam, Ordered to Commit Fraud].
56. Id. Ms. Vinson was the daughter of parents who owned a typewriter shop,
where she worked summers as a college student. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Pulliam reports that by this time Vinson had ten employees reporting to
her.
59. See Masters, supra note 20.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Pulliam, Ordered to Commit Fraud, supra note 55, at Al.
64. Id. Pulliam reports that Sullivan told her to defer quitting because "they had
planes in the air. Once they have landed, if you still want to leave, then leave, but not
while the planes were in the air." Id.
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things around so that WorldCom could meet Wall Street's expecta-
tions.65 Vinson decided to stay because she accepted Sullivan's
representations and wondered what right she had to question his
strategy since, as Pulliam stated, he was "heralded as one of the top
chief financial officers in the country. ' 66 In addition, Vinson felt
personal financial pressures to stay.67 She decided to help him just
that one time.68
Of course, one need not be a fortuneteller to predict that the
manipulation would not end on that one occasion. Vinson and
Normand ended up manipulating the figures for five additional
quarters .69  Eventually, the deception was revealed when
WorldCom collapsed.70 The United States Attorney for Mississippi
launched an investigation into WorldCom's financial irregularities.
Initially, Vinson and Normand were not targets of investigation by
the United States Attorney in Mississippi. 71 They voluntarily came
in and gave the office the information they had about the fraud.72
However, the investigation was eventually taken over by the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
who did treat Vinson and Normand as targets of the investiga-
tion.7 3 Vinson was charged with conspiracy and securities fraud.74
She pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government's
prosecution of Sullivan and Ebbers When it was time for Vinson
to be sentenced, the judge stated that she believed Vinson was at
the lowest level of culpability for the fraud that took place at
WorldCom.76 Yet, at the same time, she felt that without Vinson's
false entries, WorldCom's true financial condition would have been
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. She rationalized that she was the primary breadwinner of the family and
her family depended on her insurance coverage. Id. In this regard, Vinson shared the
approach many female street crime offenders use when weighing whether to stay with
drug-dealing men.
68. Id.
69. Maximillian B. Torres, The Scandal of Anti-Truth: The Era of Fraud, AcrON
INST. (Acton Institute for the Study of Religion & Liberty, Grand Rapids, MI), Jan.
26, 2005, available at http://www.acton.org/ppolicy/comment/article.php?id=245.
- 70. See John Borland, WorldCom Finances in Upheaval; CFO Fired, NEWS.COM,
June 25, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1033-939344.html.
71. Pulliam, Ordered to Commit Fraud, supra note 55, at Al.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Masters, supra note 20.
76. See 2 Ex-execs Sentenced in WorldCom Scandal, CLARION-LEDGER, Aug. 6,
2005, available at http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050806/
NEWS0108/508060345/1002.
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discovered much earlier.77 Vinson received a term of five months
in prison and five months of house arrest.78 Normand was sen-
tenced to three years probation. 79 There is no evidence that Vin-
son reaped any undue financial reward, other than a promotion,
which brought her to a higher salary level. Her decision to help
was motivated by loyalty to Sullivan, Yates, and WorldCom, as well
as by the fear of the financial repercussions she would incur if she
did not help.
Not everyone believed Vinson's sentence was just. A former
federal prosecutor stated that neither Vinson nor Normand should
have been charged at all, but since they were charged, both should
have received the same punishment. 80 He argued that Vinson was
a low-level employee who did not bear major responsibility for the
massive fraud that occurred at WorldCom. Here, too, Vinson's
predicament can be compared with those of low-level female street
crime offenders. Her actions were directed by other men who par-
ticipated in the highest level of decision-making and reaped finan-
cial reward.
B. United States v. Lea Fastow
1. The Charges
Of the six white-collar defendants, Lea Fastow's charges were
the most serious. She was initially charged with one count of con-
spiracy to commit wire fraud and defraud the United States;81
money laundering conspiracy;82 and four counts of subscribing to a
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The former prosecutor, Jacob Frenkel, thought it was outrageous that Vin-
son would get the same sentence Martha Stewart received. He stated that "[t]he deci-
sion to prosecute these two people is like taking a sledge hammer to a thumb tack."
Id. Scott Sullivan entered into a cooperation agreement of his own and pled guilty to
securities fraud. He received a five-year sentence. See Sullivan Gets Five Years for
WorldCom Fraud - Fifth WorldCom Executive Sentenced to Prison in $11 Billion
Scandal, MSNBC, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8907976. But see
Torres, supra note 69 (contrasting Vinson, whose actions were driven by loyalty to her
boss and by her own financial concerns, with Cynthia Cooper, the female accountant
who, at great risk to herself, blew the whistle on WorldCom).
81. Indictment, United States v. Fastow, 300 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (No.
H-03).
82. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(h) (West 2006). The money laundering stat-
utes concentrate on fraudulent activities involving proceeds of unlawful activity. The
elements of money laundering are that the defendant took part in a financial transac-
tion, knowing that the property involved in the transaction involved proceeds of ille-
gal activity; that the property involved was in fact the proceeds of illegal activity; and
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false tax return.83 Ms. Fastow held the title of Director and Assis-
tant Treasurer of Corporate Finance at Enron from 1991 until
1997. 4 Her husband, Andrew Fastow, was Enron's Chief Financial
Officer from 1997 until 2001; prior to that time he was the Manag-
ing Director. At the time of the activities that formed the basis of
the charges against her, Ms. Fastow was no longer employed by
Enron and was a stay-at-home mother.86 During the time in ques-
tion, Andrew Fastow and Michael Kopper created several Special
Purpose Entities (SPEs) to hold off-balance sheet treatment of as-
sets held by Enron.87 Through the SPEs, Mr. Fastow was able to
move debt off the books of Enron, thus concealing the true eco-
nomic health of the corporation. These entities could only legiti-
mately qualify as off-balance sheet entities if independent third
party investors contributed at least three percent of the SPE's capi-
tal, and that investment was genuinely at risk.88 If the third party
was not truly independent or its equity not truly at risk, the SPE
had to be consolidated onto Enron's balance sheet.89 There were
at least four SPEs created by Mr. Fastow that did not have inde-
pendent third party investors and which did not hold at-risk invest-
ments. Ms. Fastow assisted with concealing the fraudulent nature
of two of the SPEs.9° In both cases, Ms. Fastow accepted "gifts" in
finally that the defendant knew that the transaction was designed in whole or in part
to conceal or disguise the nature, source, location, ownership, or control of illegal
proceeds. See ELLEN S. PODGOR & JEROLD ISRAEL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN A
NUTSHELL 195 (2d ed. 1997).
83. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7206 (1). In order to establish this felony, the government must
prove that the defendant willfully signed a return, statement, or other document
under penalties of perjury; that the return, statement or document was materially
false; and that at the time of signing the defendant did not believe it to be true and
correct. Violations of the statute carry the possibility of a term of imprisonment of
three years. PODGOR & ISRAEL, supra note 82, at 179.
84. See Indictment, supra note 81, II. Lea Fastow is the heir to Weingarten
Realty Investors, a Houston, Texas-based real estate investment trust with 355 in-
come-producing and new development properties in twenty-one states. See Wein-
garten Realty Investors, http://www.weingarten.com. She graduated from Tufts
University and obtained an M.B.A. in Finance from Northeastern Kellogg School of
Business in 1987. Mike France, Heiress in Handcuffs, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 24, 2003,
available at http://businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_47/b3859001_mzOO1.htm.
85. See Indictment, supra note 81, 11.3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The two SPEs mentioned in connection with Lea Fastow were RADR and
CHEWCO. Id. In RADR, Lea Fastow and her husband loaned money to Kopper,
for him to loan to the so-called independent investors. Andrew Fastow controlled the
distribution of RADR proceeds through Kopper. Id.
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her name and in the names of her children, knowing that the gifts
were kickbacks. 91 In another instance, the Fastows were attempt-
ing to hide the fact that Ms. Fastow's father was used as an "inde-
pendent" third party of RADR.92 When the Fastows realized that
the father's ownership would trigger a reporting requirement, they
had him pull out of the deal. Ms. Fastow convinced her father to
file a false tax return in an effort to continue hiding their involve-
ment in the SPE.93 On the most serious count, Ms. Fastow faced a
potential term of imprisonment of twenty years.94
Approximately six months after her husband's indictment on
ninety-eight counts, ranging from conspiring to commit securities
fraud to filing a false tax return, Ms. Fastow was indicted.95 The
prosecution of Ms. Fastow was commonly believed to be motivated
by the government's desire to pressure her husband into cooperat-
ing with the government, and assist in its investigation of the role
that Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay may have played in conceal-
ing and/or directing the fraud at Enron.96 Initially, the government
and the Fastows had agreed to a plea bargain for Ms. Fastow that
would have allowed her to plead to one felony count of filing a
false tax return.97 Mr. Fastow would plead to two counts of con-
spiracy and agree to serve a ten-year sentence once his cooperation
had ended.98 In return, the government would recommend a five-
month prison sentence for Ms. Fastow, with an additional five
months of house arrest.99 United States District Judge David
Hittner rejected the proposed plea because it gave him no leeway
to increase the sentence, and he set Ms. Fastow's case for trial.1°°
91. See Indictment, supra note 81. Ms. Fastow received a total of $141,218.00 from
RADR.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Mary Flood, Fastow Pleads Not Guilty to 78-Count Indictment, HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 7, 2002, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mp/special/enron/
1651437.html.
95. See Wife of Ex-Enron CFO Released from Prison, MSNBC, June 6, 2005, http:/
/www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8117665/.
96. See Crawford, supra note 19.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Enron Task Force Eases Up on Lea Fastow, BILLINGS GAZETrE (Houston,
Tex.), Mar. 17, 2004, available at BillingsGazette.com (type headline in search box)
(Prosecutors objected to an apparent suggestion in a pre-sentence report that Lea
Fastow's sentence could be made stiffer.).
100. See Flood, supra note 19. In Ms. Fastow's pre-sentence report, which is not
available to the public, there may have been a recommendation that the court could
or should enhance Ms. Fastow's sentencing range, which spanned ten to sixteen
months. Prosecutors argued against an enhancement saying Ms. Fastow played an
2006] 857
FORDHAM URB. L.J.
The court's rejection of the plea caused a small media flash as
many questioned what effect the denial of the bargain would have
on Mr. Fastow's enthusiasm during the course of his coopera-
tion.10 1 The plea deal for Ms. Fastow was reworked and the court
accepted a plea to a misdemeanor charge of submitting a personal
tax return in 2000 that failed to include $47,800 in income. 10 2 Ms.
Fastow was sentenced to a term of one year in prison.10 3 Though
Judge Hittner accepted the second plea, he was disturbed by the
prosecution's behavior during the course of the negotiations. 0 4 He
accused the prosecutors of manipulating the justice system to
achieve their goals.0 5
There is no hint of why Lea Fastow agreed to participate in the
concealment of the RADR and CHEWCO proceeds. Ms. Fastow
had access to wealth of her own, independent of her husband's as-
sets which makes it unlikely that financial need drove her decision
making. In her sentencing remarks, Fastow stated merely that she
had made errors in judgment that she would always regret. 10 6 The
government never alleged that she masterminded the fraud at
RADR or CHEWCO. Rather, it was her husband who exposed
Ms. Fastow to prosecution through his criminal acts. One can im-
agine that even a woman who is independently wealthy may have
difficulty refusing a request for assistance from her intimate part-
ner and the father of her children. Perhaps Fastow had to weigh
and balance the same benefits, interests, and risks of being associ-
ated with a criminal intimate partner as the many women charged
with street crime.
integral role in getting her husband to cooperate. See Enron Task Force Eases Up on
Lea Fastow, supra note 99.
101. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Judge Rejects Plea Deal of Enron Figure's Wife, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at B1.
102. See Enron Task Force Eases Up on Lea Fastow, supra note 99. The amount
was part of over $204,000 in undeclared income over the course of four years.
103. See Crawford, supra note 19.
104. Id.
105. The pertinent part of the court's remarks were, "The Department of Justice's
behavior might be seen as a blatant manipulation of the federal justice system and is
of great concern to this court." Id. It is not altogether clear whether the court was
offended that such serious charges had been brought against Lea Fastow to coerce her
husband into a plea, or that the government made such serious allegations against her
but seemed all too eager to sacrifice punishing her in order to gain her husband's
cooperation.
106. Id. Fastow was quoted as saying "I've made errors in judgment, I will always
regret. I didn't understand the impact they would have on my family and friends. I
only intend to do right from now on." Id.
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2. The Children
During the renegotiation of the second plea, it was widely re-
ported that Ms. Fastow was interested in a plea that would allow
her children to stay at home with one parent while the other was
incarcerated, rather than running the risk that both parents would
be incarcerated at the same time. °7 The government apparently
acquiesced to this request. 08 Why the prosecution was sensitive to
Ms. Fastow's childcare needs and her wishes to protect her children
from the indignity of having both parents incarcerated is not at all
clear, and is certainly a departure from common prosecutorial
practice.
There are many Black and Latina women who are arrested at the
same time as their husbands and boyfriends because the govern-
ment is trying to pressure the husbands by arresting the women
associated with them.10 9 However, no generous provisions are
made or negotiated for those women and the care of their children.
There are over 1.3 million children in the United States who have a
mother under correctional sanction.110 According to Greenberg
and Snell, sixty-four percent of women reported living with their
minor children before entering prison, compared to forty-four per-
cent of men.'11 The rate of fathers living with children does not,
however, provide the full custodial picture. When a father is incar-
cerated, children are three times more likely to live with the other
parent than when the mothers are in prison.112 Seventy percent of
women incarcerated in local jails are mothers." 3 In the federal sys-
tem, the United States Sentencing Commission's Policy Statement
5H1.6 specifically restricts the court's use of family ties as a basis
for formulating a defendant's sentence."I4 Moreover, when district
107. See Crawford, supra note 19; Flood, supra note 19.
108. In discussing the prospect of taking the Fastow's children into account, Prose-
cutor Andrew Weissman, Director of the Enron Task Force, was reported as saying,
"There is no reason for the government, when it can, to have a husband and wife
serve their sentences at the same time." See Mary Flood, Wife of Former Enron Chief
Financial Officer Gets One-Year Prison Sentence, HOUSTON CHRON., May 7, 2004.
109. LAPIDUS ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET, supra note 28, at 35.
110. Myrna S. Raeder, A Primer on Gender Related Issues That Affect Female Of-
fenders, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4, 7 (2004) [hereinafter Raeder, A Primer].
111. GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 26, at 8.
112. LAPIDUS ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET, supra note 28, at Executive Summary.
Ten percent of children with mothers incarcerated in state prisons are in foster homes
or agencies, and seventy-nine percent live with a grandparent or relative. Id.
113. GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 26, at 7. The figure is sixty-five percent for
women in state prisons, and fifty-nine percent for women incarcerated in federal facil-
ities. Id.
114. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2004).
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court judges have attempted to accommodate a mother's concerns
for the custodial well being of her children by giving the mother a
downward departure from the sentencing guidelines, federal prose-
cutors have aggressively challenged those departures.1 1 5 The cir-
cuit court judges are likely to uphold the prosecutor's objections to
downward departures. These mothers are mostly poor women of
color, and their children are forced to deal with parent/child sepa-
ration and potential termination of the mother's parental rights by
the state."16 High status saved Lea Fastow's children from the
trauma the children of poor defendants face when forcibly sepa-
rated from their mothers through arrest and incarceration.
C. Martha Stewart
1. The Charges
In December 2001, ImClone, a pharmaceutical company, was on
the verge of receiving notice that the Food and Drug Administra-
tion would not accept its application for the approval of a drug
Imclone was developing." 7 The founder and CEO of ImClone,
Sam Waksal, attempted to have Merrill Lynch & Co. sell all of his
shares of the company stock prior to the announcement becoming
public." 8 Peter Bacanovic, a securities broker at Merrill Lynch,
knew that his client Martha Stewart was a friend of Waksal's, and
tried to get a message to her that Waksal was selling large blocks of
stock. 1 9 When Bacanovic was unable to reach Stewart directly, he
instructed his assistant, Doug Faneuil, to handle any return calls
from Stewart.120 Stewart spoke with Faneuil, who communicated
the fact that Waksal was selling his shares of ImClone.'2 ' On De-
115. LAPIDUS ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET, supra note 28, at 40 (citing the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit).
116. Incarceration serves as a ground for termination of parental rights in many
states. See Antoinette Greenway, When Neutral Policies Aren't so Neutral: Increasing
Incarceration Rates and the Effect of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 on the
Parental Rights of African American Women, 17 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 247, 254-55 (2003-
2004); Raeder, A Primer, supra note 110, at 19; see also Philip Genty, Damage to
Family Relationships As a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1671, 1678 (2003) (citing a two-hundred-fifty percent increase in the
number of parental terminations in the five years since AFSA was enacted).
117. Original Indictment at 5-6, 11, United States v. Martha Stewart (No. 1:03-
CR-00717), available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/marthaindictl.html
(last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
118. Id. at 6, 13.
119. Id. at 7, T16.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 7-8, 117.
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cember 27, 2001 she ordered her holdings to be sold.122 The next
day, when the FDA announcement was released, ImClone shares
lost eighteen percent of their value.123 Martha Stewart made profit
of approximately $45,000 from the sale. 2 4 The precipitous drop in
the value of ImClone shares prompted the government to investi-
gate large sales of stock made by insiders the day before the an-
nouncement was made. 25 Investigators sought to question Martha
Stewart about any conversations she may have had with Baca-
novic.126 Though not under oath, she met with the investigators
and was interviewed on two occasions. 127 Bacanovic told investiga-
tors that there had been a pre-existing agreement with Stewart that
her shares were to be sold when the stock reached a certain
price.a28 Stewart concurred that such an agreement existed. 2 9 It
was the government's position that Stewart and Bacanovic con-
cocted the idea of a pre-existing agreement to cover up their possi-
ble insider trading. 130
Stewart was indicted for one count of conspiracy to obstruct jus-
tice, obstruction of justice, and securities fraud, and two counts of
making a false statement.13' Throughout the period from arrest
through trial, Stewart maintained that the charges were ridiculous,
that she was innocent, and that she believed she would be vindi-
cated. 132 The evidence at trial demonstrated, however, that both
Bacanovic and Faneuil had communicated to Stewart that Waksal
was about to sell his shares. 133 The government's case included
Stewart's phone log, which included a message from Bacanovic
that something was going on with Waksal and the ImClone
shares.13 1 Stewart's own secretary was called as a government wit-
ness and testified that Stewart had attempted to alter the phone log
122. Id.
123. Id. at 8, 20
124. Id. at 8-9, 21.
125. Id. at 9, 22.
126. Id. at 11, 25.
127. Id. at 12, 27.
128. Id. at 11, 24(a).
129. Id. at 13, 27(a).
130. Id. at 9-10, 23.
131. For a discussion of the government practice of using one false statement that is
repeated on multiple occasions as the basis for multiple counts of false statements or
perjury, see Seigel & Slobogin, supra note 13.
132. See Jeffrey Toobin, A Bad Thing: Why Did Martha Stewart Lose?, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 22, 2004, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040322
fafacti.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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to delete the subject matter of the call. 135 After a very public trial,
the jury found Stewart guilty of conspiracy, both counts of making
a false statement, and one count of obstruction of agency proceed-
ings. 13 6 The court dismissed the securities count at the close of the
government's case. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, Stew-
art fell in the range of ten to sixteen months.137 Stewart's attorney
asked the court to consider the fact that his client had already suf-
fered the stress of being arrested and tried in determining whether
a jail sentence was appropriate.1 38 Through her lawyer, Stewart of-
fered the possibility of performing volunteer work with poor wo-
men as an alternative to incarceration.1 39  Judge Miriam
Cedarbaum rejected the sentencing alternative, choosing instead to
sentence her to five months imprisonment, followed by two years
of probation that included five months of home confinement. 140
She was also fined thirty thousand dollars.141
2. Contrition
During the time Martha was prosecuted she maintained a web
site where her fans could read messages from her, and keep them-
selves updated on her case.142 Stewart prepared remarks for her
sentencing in which she neither apologized nor expressed any kind
of guilt or remorse for her activities. 143 She did indicate that she
was sorry for the inconvenience and suffering her employees ex-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Brickey, supra note 12, at 536.
139. Stewart and her lawyer had worked out an agreement with Women's Venture
Fund, a nonprofit organization in New York, under which Stewart would train low-
income and minority women how to begin their own cleaning companies. Id. at 541.
At first the Fund Director objected to Stewart's proposal, but she was eventually con-
vinced of its merits. She would later state, "Can you imagine if we had graduates of
the Martha Stewart cleaning program bidding for contracts cleaning Hilton Hotels?"
Id. at 541 n.153. It is interesting that Stewart chose to train the women about how to
start their own cleaning companies. Why was cleaning selected? She had experiences
in many businesses, including catering. One might ask whether the idea was tainted
by unconscious racial or class stereotyping.
140. Rochelle Steinhaus, Judge Sentences Stewart to Prison, but Grants Stay Pending
Appeal, COURTTv.cOM, http://www.courttv.com/trials/stewart/071604_ctv.html.
141. Id.
142. See Martha Stewart Uses Personal Web Site to Rally Support, COURTTv.cOM,
http://www.courttv.com/news/2004/0112/stewart-ap.html.
143. Steinhaus, supra note 140.
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perienced. 144 She continued to express annoyance at the fact that
"such a small thing" had been blown out of proportion.145
In addition, throughout the course of her home confinement it
appeared that Stewart flagrantly violated the terms of her house
arrest, appearing outside of her restricted areas. She boasted in an
interview that she had watched the authorities putting her monitor-
ing bracelet on and that Lil' Kim knew how to remove it.146 The
public will never be privy to the exchanges between Stewart and
her parole officer, but it is instructive that her period of home con-
finement was extended by three weeks.147 A fair conclusion would
be that Stewart was punished for failing to follow the terms of her
home confinement? 48
3. Loyalty
It is hard to determine whether Martha Stewart was motivated
by loyalty in denying her interactions with the Merrill Lynch repre-
sentatives. It was publicly known that Sam Waksal was a good
friend of hers. Did she fear her acknowledgement of a conversa-
tion with Doug Faneuil or Peter Bacanovic might hurt Waksal?
Even if that was initially a factor, Waksal was indicted and pled
guilty before her own indictment. Her cover-up on the tip from
Bacanovic could not have hurt or helped Waksal. What then could
have led her to continue to stand by her false statement? From the
information available, it does not appear that she would have been
extraordinarily loyal to Bacanovic; although they were described as
friends, they were not social acquaintances.1 49 While he was her
personal broker and handled her account when Martha Stewart
Living Omnimedia had its initial public offering, there was other
evidence that the relationship was anything but smooth.15 0 It ap-
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Martha Stewart Calls Her Five-Month House Arrest 'Hideous', COURTTv.
COM, http://www.courttv.com/trials/stewart/070605-ap.html. Stewart claimed she was
able to search the Internet to find out how to remove the monitoring device. It is
unknown whether she actually removed it. Id.
147. Maria Puente & Gary Levin, Martha Still Tethered, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2005,
at D1.
148. A probation officer has several courses of action that may be taken when a
probationer violates the terms of house arrest. At the very least, a violation report
detailing the violation is made and the officer makes a recommendation. The recom-
mendation can range from continuing to monitor to recommending incarceration. See
Sylvia J. Ansay, When Home Is A Prison (May 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Florida) (on file with author).
149. See Toobin, supra note 132.
150. Id.
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pears not that Stewart was trying to be loyal to her friends and
associates, but rather that they were trying to be loyal to her.
Stewart does not seem to fit the traditional pattern of women of-
fenders because among the defendants discussed in this article, she
is the only one who controlled her own destiny. Stewart was not
clustered at the bottom of a hierarchy, she was at the helm. In
falling outside of the norm for female offending, her actions may
be more in line with the traditional male white-collar offender.
IV. HIGH STATUS COLLIDES WITH STREET CRIME
A. Li' Kim's Case
1. The Facts of the Case
Rapper Li' Kim is known throughout the world for her musical
talents.' 5' She is also an entrepreneurial businesswoman with an
aggressive marketing agenda. 52 Though she had high status be-
cause of her celebrity and wealth, she couldn't have been more dif-
ferent than the other three high-status white-collar women
offenders discussed here. She did not come from a wealthy family.
Her parents divorced when she was nine years old.'53 "Lil' Kim
lived with her father until she ran away from home as a teenager,
and survived by associating herself with drug dealers, and may
have even prostituted herself."'1 54 Her life began to take a turn for
the better when rapper Christopher Wallace, also known as the
Notorious B.I.G., introduced her to his prot6g6s, Junior
M.A.F.I.A., where she became the only female rapper of the
group. 55 Kim's career was blossoming when her mentor was
killed. His death took an emotional toll on her and led her to take
151. See A Year and a Day for Lil' Kim, CNN.coM, July 7, 2005, http://www.cnn.
com/2005/LAW/07/07/ctv.lilkim/index.html.
152. At the time her legal troubles were coming to the public's attention, Lil' Kim
was in the process of developing and releasing a high-end line of designer watches
which bore the brand Queen B Royalty Watch. The watches are marketed in the
$1,800 to $3,500 range. See Carl "H.D." Cherry, Lil' Kim Stays On Time, Aug. 12,
2004, http://www.sohh.com/articles/article.php/6133. She also had plans to enter into
the designer footwear market. Remmie Fresh, Queen B Drops Royalty Watch, June 1,
2004, www.allhiphop.com/hiphopnews/?ID=3210.
153. See Lil' Kim, http://www.askmen.com/women/singer/54c-lil-kim.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 12, 2006).
154. Id.; see also Sentencing Transcript at 45, United States v. Butler, No. S104-
CR.340(GEL), 2004 WL 2274751 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that both Lil' Kim and her
mother had experienced homelessness).
155. See Lil' Kim, supra note 153.
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some time off from performing.156 Eventually, she returned and
re-ignited her career.
Li' Kim became of interest to the government in its investiga-
tion of a shooting that occurred between two rival groups on the
street outside a radio studio in lower Manhattan in 2001.57 Al-
though Lil' Kim was not suspected of being the shooter or partici-
pating in the shoot out, the government believed she knew the
identity of some of those involved in the shoot out.158 In fact, one
of the shooters, Damion Butler, had been one of her managers and
a friend of hers since the beginning of her career.1 59 The other
individual, Suif Jackson, if not a friend, was certainly a known ac-
quaintance and had acted as Li' Kim's bodyguard on occasion.
161
When questioned about the identity of the shooters, Lil' Kim de-
nied knowing the identity of the shooters and denied that she had
seen or been in the company of Butler or Jackson on the day of the
shooting.16 1 She was called before the grand jury on several occa-
sions and falsely testified at each appearance. 62 The government
indicted Lil' Kim for conspiracy to commit perjury, three counts of
perjury and one count of obstruction of justice.163 At her trial, the
former members of the Junior M.A.F.I.A., compelled to appear by
subpoena, testified that Lil' Kim knew Butler and Jackson, and that
the two accompanied her to and from the studio on the day of the
shooting. 164 Li' Kim testified on her own behalf and repeated her
denials, despite the fact that a security video supplied by the radio
station clearly showed her entering the radio studio with Butler,
and standing near him at the time the shooting occurred. 165 The
jury convicted Lil' Kim on three counts of perjury but acquitted
her on the obstruction of justice charge. 1 66
At her sentencing, Judge Gerald Lynch engaged in a long series
of exchanges with the prosecutor over the appropriate sentencing
range for Lil' Kim. The officer completing her pre-sentence report
156. Id.
157. See A Year and A Day For Lil' Kim, supra note 151.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Butler, 2004 WL 2274751, at *1.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Lil' Kim Takes Stand At Perjury Trial, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.comlife/people/2005-03-10-lil-kim-x.htm?csp=34.
165. See A Year and A Day For Lil' Kim, supra note 151; see also Sentencing Tran-
script, supra note 154, at 22-23 (colloquy between Judge Lynch and AUSA Gitner).
166. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 154, at 22-23.
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advocated she be sentenced in the twenty-seven to thirty-three
month range.167 The range was calculated by using a provision in
the guidelines giving the court discretion to cross-reference the
base level for perjury with the base level of the offense that the
defendant was trying to cover up.168 Aggravated assault was sug-
gested by the government as the appropriate base offense. 169 The
government advocated for a sentencing range of thirty three to
forty one months, and asked the judge to deny the defendant any
credit for acceptance of responsibility.170 Judge Lynch expressed
concern that the use of aggravated assault as the base level offense
was inappropriate, although an alternative calculation based on a
"felon in possession" charge provided a greater possibility of jail
time.' 7' In its final analysis, the court could find no reason to use
anything other than the baseline offense for perjury as the appro-
priate guideline. 72 Judge Lynch was clearly concerned with the
possibility a harsh sentence imposed on Lil' Kim would be per-
ceived by the public as an indication that the system of justice was
biased. 173 He worried that the case would be compared with
Martha Stewart's five-month prison term. 74 Although the court
perceived the two cases to be materially different, the judge won-
dered how he could sentence Lil' Kim to a substantially higher sen-
tence for behavior that on the surface appeared substantially
equivalent to Stewart's. 175 The court asked the United States At-
torney and defense counsel to comment on the similarities of the
167. Id. at 10. Pre-sentencing reports are confidential. Judge Lynch referenced the
recommendation in a discussion in open court with counsel.
168. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X3.1 (2004).
169. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 154, at 29-31.
170. Id. at 18, 29-31 In arguing to the court that a higher offense level should be
used, the Assistant United District Attorney (AUSA) suggested that the fact Lil' Kim
and her group remained outside of the radio station demonstrated that there was
something more sinister afoot. Id. at 22-25. The court rejected this argument, stating
that they could have stayed outside hanging out and signing autographs, and that
there was no proof that Ms. Jones' group was planning an attack. Id. at 30-31.
171. See id. at 25-28 (colloquy between Judge Lynch and counsel).
172. See id. at 31. The base offense level for perjury was fourteen. To that the court
added a two level enhancement for the perjury at trial, bringing offense level to six-
teen. Id. A defendant at level sixteen and in Criminal History category one would be
exposed to a sentence of twenty-one to twenty-seven months imprisonment under the
guidelines. Id. Judge Lynch made it clear that the sentence was being decided in light
of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that federal
sentencing guidelines are advisory, not mandatory). See Sentencing Transcript, supra
note 154, at 28, 54-57, 77.
173. Id. at 50-51. Lii' Kim is a Black female.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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two cases if there were any. 176 Not surprisingly, the government
made every effort to distinguish the two cases, arguing that Li'
Kim was under oath in the grand jury, that she perjured herself at
trial, and that the underlying offense Lil' Kim tried to cover up was
not a securities question, but rather a violent street crime.177
On the other hand, while acknowledging the difference between
a shooting and insider trading, defense counsel pointed out that
Lil' Kim neither knew about the shooting, nor participated in it,
but rather, out of a misplaced sense of loyalty and perhaps as a
result of bad legal advice, tried to help protect a friend.17 8 When
the debate had concluded and Lii' Kim made her remarks to the
court, Judge Lynch determined that he would credit Ms. Jones for
her acceptance of responsibility, which dropped her to a sentencing
range of twelve to eighteen months.179 The court still seemed to be
concerned with the possibility that Lil' Kim's case would be com-
pared to Martha Stewart's sentencing."8 Judge Lynch stated that
the purpose of the guidelines was to avoid disparity in sentenc-
ing.181 However, in the final analysis, Judge Lynch argued that "ly-
ing to the grand jury about people getting shot and carrying
machine guns is just more serious than lying about money, no mat-
ter how much money."'18 2 But in a final nod to the shadow of the
Stewart case, Judge Lynch pointed out that Stewart's sentence was
not just five months in prison, but also five months under house
176. Id. at 51, 53-54.
177. Id. at 57-59.
178. Id. at 38. Defense counsel alluded at sentencing that Lil' Kim's prior attorney
had not provided Li' Kim with proper advice at the grand jury stage.
179. Id. at 70. The AUSA on the case argued to the very end of the proceedings
that Lil' Kim should not have been given any credit for acceptance of responsibility,
characterizing her apology as a "ritual expression of remorse." Id. at 78.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 71. While the judge's belief does reflect judicial attitudes towards white-
collar crime, an argument can certainly be made that lying about money, particularly
significant sums, is more a serious offense than many street crimes, even ones which
are deemed violent. The Enron fraud, for example, created the largest bankruptcy in
history and destroyed the retirement savings of thousands of employees. Krysten
Crawford, Ex-WorldCom CEO Ebbers Guilty, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 15, 2005, http:/
/money.cnn.com/2005/03/15/news/newsmakers/ebbers/index.htm. Many real people
were injured in concrete ways that far exceed the injuries that were caused in the Lil'
Kim shootout.
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arrest, so that her actual sentence was ten months. 183 Judge Lynch
sentenced Lil' Kim to twelve months and one day.184
2. Loyalty's Role
During the trial, the prosecutor argued that Lil' Kim lied under
oath to protect her friends. 185 Lil' Kim testified that her friendship
with Butler and Jackson had soured; therefore, she had no reason
to lie on their behalf.18 6 The fact that the friendship soured be-
tween her grand jury appearances and trial did not, however, elimi-
nate the fact that at the time of the shooting incident and during
the time the case was being investigated before the grand jury, Lil'
Kim was friends with Butler, and arguably with Jackson as well. 187
Her lawyer argued at sentencing that misplaced loyalty led her to
cover up Butler's crime.1 88 The judge clearly believed this to be
true, and pointed to what he called a culture of non-cooperation
among members of the hip-hop community and the police. 89 In-
deed, during and after the trial, a debate did take place within that
community as to whether Lil' Kim should have cooperated with
the investigation, and whether other artists who testified in re-
sponse to subpoenas were "snitches."'19
It would not be surprising to find that loyalty, particularly to the
men in her life, would be an important factor. Feminist scholars
have argued that the Black community demands loyalty from its
women to the detriment of their own interests. 91 In the end, Lil'
Kim admitted to the court that loyalty led her to do the wrong
thing and that she had taken steps to correct her mistaken reliance
on friends who did not have her best interest at heart. 192
183. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 154, at 72. Although the court did point out
that it was troubling for a defendant to be sentenced to home confinement in a home
that is more luxurious than that which most people could afford. Id.
184. Id. at 73.
185. Id. at 60, 65-67.
186. See Lil' Kim Sentenced to a Year in Prison, MSNBC, July 6, 2005, http://msnbc.
msn.com/id/8485039/.
187. Id.
188. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 154, at 38.
189. Id. at 65-67.
190. See, e.g., Clover Hope, Capone Issues Statement Regarding Lil" Kim Case, Mar.
17, 2005, http://www.allhiphop.com/hiphopnews/?10-4199; Lil' Kim: The Ladies Speak
Up on the Verdict Response, http://www.allhiphop.com/editoria/?ID=251 (last visited
Mar. 12, 2006).
191. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Piercing the Prison Uniform of Invisibility for the Black
Female Inmate, 94 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795, 807-11 (2004).
192. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 154, at 64.
868 [Vol. XXXIII
LOYALTY'S REWARD
B. White-Collar Crime, Street Crime, Morality and
Perceptions of Harm
The curious aspect of Lil' Kim's sentencing is that even though
Judge Lynch went to great pains to distinguish the Stewart case, he
ended up trying to fashion a sentence that was comparable to the
Stewart sentencing. The court seemed to be concerned with the
fact that Jones lied out of some misplaced street loyalty to protect
her wrongdoer friends. That loyalty led her to perjure herself. On
the other hand, he did not credit Stewart with a comparably selfless
motive.193 Judge Lynch, in some sense, seemed to feel that Stewart
was the more morally culpable defendant. Yet Lil' Kim's case in-
volved the kind of underlying crime that society believes is excep-
tionally dangerous: the possession and employment of deadly
weapons. It is possible to understand the tension the court faced
by contrasting the public's perception of street crime versus white-
collar crime.
It is argued that white-collar crime is treated with more leniency
by the courts, and is tolerated by the public, because there is am-
bivalence over the inherent wrongfulness of the behavior. 194 Pro-
fessor Stuart P. Green indicates this ambivalence is particularly
pronounced in "cover-up" crimes such as perjury and obstruction
of justice. 195 He suggests that the public's perception of cover-up
offenses is more heavily influenced by their feelings about the de-
fendants than by the nature of the offensive conduct itself. 96
Nonetheless, scholars have attempted to explain why white-collar
crime is treated leniently within the criminal justice system. One
such argument suggests that white-collar crime, unlike street crime,
is harder to detect, stretches the investigatory resources of the gov-
ernment, and that the harm it causes is less concrete and less cer-
tain then street crime.1 97 Some have argued that white-collar
criminals are more easily deterred than street criminals because
they are not inclined to remain engaged in criminal activities, and
have more to lose by a period of incarceration than do street
193. Id. at 71.
194. Green, supra note 8, at 502.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Szockyj, supra note 8, at 488; see also Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Cor-
porate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. Rav. 1295,
1330-31 (2001) (noting that the wealth of white-collar criminals can raise enforcement
costs for the government.).
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criminals. 98 A study of the sentencing practices of judges in white-
collar crime cases found that many judges believed that the process
of indictment and conviction was, in some cases, punishment
enough. 199 In another study, judges were troubled by the possibil-
ity that they may treat white-collar cases differently because they
can more easily identify with the white-collar offender.2"
Ambivalence toward white-collar crime is also reflected in legis-
lative decision making. Professor Green argues that categorizing
white-collar crime as specialized, regulatory portion of state and
federal law, rather than of criminal law, contributes to the senti-
ment that white-collar crimes are not real crimes.20 1 Green also
faults the legislature for authorizing penalties that are less severe
for white-collar than for equally or less serious street crimes; he
sees this as contributing to ambiguity over whether white-collar of-
fenses are crimes. Finally, Green points out that moral ambigu-
ity is created through the actions of judges and prosecutors.
Prosecutors may be more lenient in a white-collar case than they
would be when handling a case involving a traditional street
crime.20 3 Judges who would normally be tough on street crime
tend to be lenient in their treatment of white-collar crime.20 4
On the other hand, government officials have argued for tougher
sentences, claiming that lighter sentences for white-collar criminals
198. Szockyj, supra note 8, at 492 (citing John Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, On The-
ory and Action for Corporate Crime Control, 28 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 292 (1982)).
199. Martin F. Murphy, No Room At The Inn? Punishing White-Collar Criminal, 40
BOSTON B.J. 4 (1996). Though the study was before the sentencing guidelines on
white collar crime became fully effective, Szockyj argues that even after the federal
sentencing guidelines increased prison sentences for white-collar offenders, street of-
fenders are still sentenced more severely. Szockyj, supra note 8, at 496.
200. See Murphy, supra note 199, at 13 (citing WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDG-
MENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS 156 (1988)). In fact, the
judges of the Criminal Law Committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference suggested that
the Sentencing Commission enhance penalties for economic crime. Their recommen-
dations helped formulate the package of amendments included in the Economic
Crimes Package of 2001. See Are We Really Getting Tough on White Collar Crime?
Part 2: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Frank 0. Bowman, III, Professor of Law), available
at 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 237, 2003 WL 22016895, at *1 (2003).
201. See Green, supra note 8, at 514. Brown also looks at the criminal/civil hybrid
contained in many regulatory laws as further blurring the line between white-collar
crime and non-criminal cases. Brown, supra note 197, at 1335.
202. Green, supra note 8, at 515.
203. Id. at 516 (citing the example of Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion's reluctance to prosecute employers for safety violations despite the fact that
between 1982 and 2002, at least 1,242 cases were investigated in which workers died
due to safety violations).
204. Id.
870 [Vol. XXII
LOYALTY'S REWARD
have not produced a deterrent effect. Many believe that even with
the sentencing guidelines enhancements that provide stiffer penalty
ranges, white-collar offenders are still sentenced at the lowest end
of the ranges. °5 Moreover, if probation is an option, the white
collar defendant will almost always be sentenced to probation.20 6
Therefore, strict penalties are needed to ensure that white-collar
defendants receive tougher sentences.
Professor Strader argues that judicial sentencing leniency with
white-collar offenders is tied to the political philosophies that
shape a judge's view of crime.20 7 Thus, conservative judges per-
ceive the harm from street crime in a different light from the harm
of white-collar crime. Violence and the threat of physical harm are
associated with street crime. For conservative judges, street crime
raises traditional law and order issues, and punishment is relied on
as the default method of accomplishing the goals of law enforce-
ment with respect to public safety.20 8 Since there is no physical
harm in white-collar crime, these same judges do not generally feel
compelled to abide by their law and order tendencies. 20 9
Scholars, judges, defense lawyers, and other commentators who
advocate against incarceration of white-collar criminals do not
seem to realize that many of the traits they describe as positive
among white-collar offenders, such as lack of prior involvement
with the law and providing economic support to family and com-
munity, are also present for street crime offenders. Recent studies
indicate, for example, that up to sixty percent of incarcerated indi-
viduals are first-time or non-violent offenders. 210 And, at least in
the case of women who are incarcerated, many are often the only
resource for extended families, and have obligations not only to
their children, but also to parents and other family members.211 In
205. See Summer 2002: The Genesis of the Sentencing Provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act: Are We Really Getting Tough on White Collar Crime? Part 1: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. On Crime and Drugs, 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of James B. Comey, U.S. Att'y, S.D.N.Y.), available at 15 FED.
SENT'G REP. 237, 2003 WL 22016894, at 5 (2003).
206. Id. at 3.
207. Strader, supra note 8, at 1267.
208. Id. at 1267-68.
209. Id. at 1267 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 & n.12 (1984)). The
Supreme Court said that some white-collar felonies are far less serious than some
street crime misdemeanors. Judges with a normally liberal philosophy tend to view
white-collar crimes more stringently and are more willing to impose sanctions, partic-
ularly where the white-collar defendant has abused a position of wealth or power. Id.
at 1268.
210. GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 26, at 9.
211. LAPIDUS ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET, supra note 28, at 53.
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addition, despite the fact some judges believe that white-collar de-
fendants would not be prepared to handle the deprivation of life in
prison, other studies have found that white-collar criminals actually
adjust better to prison than do many street offenders, and suffer
fewer negative consequences upon release than do street offend-
ers.212 Many white-collar offenders, for example, can return to jobs
similar to the ones held before they were incarcerated.2 13 The
same is not true for a street crime offender who, upon release from
prison, will have tremendous difficulty obtaining employment with
a felony conviction in his or her background.
Professor Darryl Brown argues that the distinctions drawn be-
tween white-collar crime and street crime are often artificial.2 a4
Most importantly, Brown establishes that culture and social prac-
tices define what crime is. He uses the example of domestic vio-
lence, noting that, until recently, spousal battery was not
considered a crime.21 5 Despite over thirty years of advocacy and
education there are still problems getting legal actors to under-
stand domestic violence and to provide the protection the victim
needs.2 16 Another contemporary example of social and cultural
practices that relate to the issue of how our social perceptions
shape the definition of what constitutes a crime is the illegal
downloading and sharing of music files. Despite the fact that the
act itself is illegal, few people acknowledge the criminal nature of
this behavior.21 7 Brown and others argue that many white-collar
crimes do far more harm than the run-of-the-mill street offense. 1 8
He acknowledges, however, that white-collar offenders are seen as
212. Szockyj, supra note 8, at 497 (pointing out that white-collar offenders had the
management skills to negotiate the terms of confinement).
213. Id.
214. Brown, supra note 197, at 1315-16.
215. Id. at 1340.
216. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women De-
fendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 217 (2003) (outlining ways
in which lawyers, judges and the police contribute to poor representation of battered
women charged with crimes).
217. See Amy Harmon & John Schwartz, Despite Suits, Music File Sharers Shrug
Off Guilt and Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at Al.
218. Id. Another example is the sentencing of Archer Daniels Midland officials for
rigging prices. The critique of the light sentences they received was that the "execu-
tives who effectively cheated every grocery store in the country receives shorter
sentences than if they had robbed just one." Green, supra note 8, at 515 (citing Kurt
Eichenwald, White Collar Defense Stance: The Criminal-less Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 2002, at Dl). Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, when comparing the
harm from white-collar offenses and street crime, once said, "[a] street criminal can
only steal what he can carry. With the stroke of a pen, or push of the computer key,
white-collar criminals can, and do, steal billions." Murphy, supra note 199, at 14.
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reasonable, mainstream people whose crimes are often uninten-
tional.219 Street offenders, on the other hand, are seen as violent
and greedy members of a subculture whose crimes are seen as in-
tentional.22 ° In addition, Brown points out that the criminal justice
system sees street crime offenders as individuals who make free-
willed choices and are immune to social influences.2 21 By contrast,
in the corporate punishment realm, blame is placed not only on the
individual offender, but on those who influenced him as well. 2  In
addition, when weighing sentencing for a corporate or white-collar
offender, the court will often consider costs of incarceration that
run beyond punishing the individual defendant. 23 These costs are
rarely taken into consideration when punishing street crime of-
fenders, particularly in the context of the harm that occurs to a
community that has large numbers of its members subjected to in-
carceration and the other consequences that flow from
incarceration.224
The tendency in corporate matters is to work through regulation
and encourage voluntary compliance in order to help maintain gov-
ernmental legitimacy in the eyes of corporate officials. This is
striking, given the opposite tendency in punishing street crime; that
is, the overuse of punishment, despite the acknowledgement that
an excessive and disproportionate reliance on punitive measures
has undermined the perceived legitimacy of the law in some com-
munities. Brown asserts that this result is demonstrated through
jury nullification and the community members' refusal to cooper-
ate in police investigations. 25 In fact, Judge Lynch stated in Lil'
219. Brown, supra note 197, at 1315.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1322. Brown argues that the use of criminal punishment "reinforces the
view that such conduct is so blameworthy that only criminal sanction is appropriate,"
whereas civil remedies dominate corporate crime. Id. at 1336.
222. Id. at 1319. Brown gives the example of the Saving and Loan scandal where
part of the blame for the large scale criminal conduct was placed on the failure of the
regulatory system, an attribution that Brown says is unthinkable in a street crime
context. Id. at 1336.
223. One of the objections to the prosecution of accounting firm Arthur Andersen
as a result of the Enron implosion was that such a prosecution would hurt not only the
individual wrongdoers, but shareholders, low-level employees, clients, and the general
community to which Arthur Andersen donated charitable contributions.
224. For the African American community, Brown lists the consequences of re-
duced employment prospects and earning capacity, less appealing marriage prospects,
more single female households, and more children under court supervision. Brown,
supra note 197, at 1307.
225. Id. at 1302; see also Paul D. Butler, The Role of Race-Based Jury Nullification:
Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 911 (1997) (arguing that the black community
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Kim's sentencing that he was concerned with the possible public
perception that the law had not been fairly (hence legitimately)
applied in her case when compared with Martha Stewart's. 26 The
judge referenced the culture in the hip-hop community of not co-
operating with police and cited it as one of the primary reasons
why the murder of Christopher Wallace had not yet been solved.227
It may be that Lil' Kim's dual status, as both a high-status defen-
dant and a street crime offender created a tension the court
seemed unable to resolve. In light of the contrasting treatment be-
tween traditional corporate crime and street crime offenses, it is
clear that although Lil' Kim engaged in perjury, a traditional white-
collar offense, the underlying offense was a street crime involving
the threat of violence; she thereby lost the white-collar character of
her actions.228
The irony of the contradiction seems so apparent when damage
caused by the bankruptcy filing of WorldCom and Enron are con-
sidered. In reality, can one argue that Lil' Kim's lie about one
shootout, which did not result in any fatalities, is more serious than
the fraud that caused the multi-billion dollar collapse of two Wall
Street behemoths, which seriously harmed the financial well-being
of thousands of employees and investors? The answer depends on
one's own views and preconceptions about morality and crime. To
many, Betty Vinson, Lea Fastow, and Martha Stewart are far more
culpable than Lil' Kim. And yet, for others, Lil' Kim is the more
morally culpable actor.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether Lea, Betty, Martha, and Lil' Kim are high-status white-
collar offenders or just high-status street crime offenders, at least
three of them engaged in offending that was partially motivated by
a sense of loyalty. In the end, they differed little from the most
common female offender, who is serving time for drug related of-
fenses, because they got in trouble as a result of their associations
with offending men. As the months pass, it will be interesting to
see what, if any, information is revealed about the three women
should use jury nullification as a tool to achieve political ends of the community
against over-criminalization of community by law enforcement).
226. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 154, at 70.
227. Id. Of course, this is Judge Lynch's view. Members of Christopher Wallace's
family believe that Wallace's murder remains unsolved because it was the police who
either murdered him or conspired with others who murdered him. See A Year and A
Day For Lil' Kim, supra note 151.
228. See Strader, supra note 8, at 1212.
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who have yet to be sentenced. Did loyalty lead them to offend, just
as it did with Lea Fastow, Betty Vinson, and Lil' Kim? Or will it be
revealed that they, like Martha Stewart, successfully transitioned
into the halls of real power? Only time and a good sentencing
transcript will tell.
l AS
